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Leidschrift, jaargang 26, nummer 3, december 2011 
There are enemies, who declare war against us, or against whom we publicly declare war; 
others are robbers or brigands. –Pomponius  
 
Not for nothing has Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) been called the Martin 
Heidegger of political theory.1 The central text of his later career, The Nomos 
of the Earth (1950), undertakes a neo-Heideggerian exercise in constitutional 
foundationalism: both the political ‘being’ of the state (political ontology) 
and the heuristic apparatus of law are grounded on the terrestrial, or telluric, 
reality of the polity. ‘In mythical language, the earth became known as the 
mother of law. This signifies a threefold root of law and justice’:2 the planet 
(‘Gaia’),3 the land, and most interestingly, walls. 
 
Soil that is cleared and worked by human hands manifests firm lines, 
whereby definite divisions become apparent. Through the 
demarcation of fields, pastures, and forests, these lines are engraved 
and embedded… the solid ground of the earth is delineated by 
fences, enclosures, boundaries, walls, houses, and other constructs. 
Then, the orders and orientations of human social life become 
apparent. Then, obviously, families, clans, tribes, estates, forms of 
ownership and human proximity, also forms of power and 
domination, become visible.4 
 
 I argue that it is precisely this uncommon emphasis upon the 
impermeability of borders, both legal and political, that distinguishes 
Schmitt from the rest of the pantheon of international lawyers, most 
                                                     
1 T. Strong, ‘Foreword’ in: C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political. Expanded Edition, 
G. Schwab trans. (Chicago 2007) ix-xxxi: xii. 
2  C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum 
Europaeum, G. L. Ulmen trans. (New York 2003) 42. 
3 ‘First, the fertile earth contains within herself, within the womb of fecundity, an 
inner measure, because human toil and trouble, human planting and cultivation of 
the fruitful earth is rewarded justly by her with growth and harvest. Every farmer 
knows the inner measure of this justice.’ Schmitt, Nomos, 42.  
4 Ibidem. 
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particularly the ‘seminal’ figure of Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). Whereas most 
international lawyers are, by definition, ‘internationalist’ to some degree, 
Schmitt authors a model of international public order premised upon a 
radically homogenous notion of the state that: (i) eternally exists in a 
condition of potential enmity with all other states; and (ii) unconditionally 
withholds recognition of the legal identity of any actor or agency that does 
not strictly conform to his model of the state. This places Schmitt at odds 
with the entirety of the modern international legal tradition which is 
conventionally understood to begin with Grotius, who views international 
public order as a radical heterogeneity of actors and personalities that 
regularly cross both legal and political boundaries. This is no more evident 
than with their respective treatment of the figure of the pirate. 
 
 
Schmitt and legal positivism 
 
According to Schmitt: 
 
In this way, the earth is bound to law in three ways. She contains law 
within herself, as a reward for labor; she manifests law upon herself, 
as fixed boundaries; and she sustains law above herself, as a public 
sign of order. Law is bound to the earth and related to the earth. 
This what the poet means when he speaks of the infinitely just earth: 
justissima telus.5 
 
This eccentric re-presentation of the telluric as judicial 
foundationalism makes more sense when we situate it within the context of 
Schmitt’s over-arching project: the identification of European legal order 
(the ius publicum Europaeum) with the demarcation, or ‘bracketing’, of war 
and inter-state violence. 
 
The essence of European international law was the bracketing of war. 
The essence of such wars was a regulated contest of forces gauged 
by witnesses in a bracketed space. Such wars are the opposite of 
disorder. They represent the highest form of order within the scope 
of human power. They are the only protection against a circle of 
increasing reprisals, i.e., against nihilistic hatreds and reactions whose 
meaningless goal lies in mutual destruction. The removal and 
                                                     
5 Schmitt, Nomos, 42. 
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avoidance of wars of destruction is possible only when a form for 
the gauging of forces is found. This is possible only when the 
opponent is recognized as an enemy on equal grounds – as a justus 
hostis. This is the given foundation for a bracketing of war.6 
 
Two rhetorical maneuvers are central to this strategy. Firstly, modern 
European law must be thoroughly secularized, making it the exclusive 
possession of ‘profane’ states that are governed by an exclusively positivist 
legal rationality. 
 
The justice of war no longer is based on conformity with the content 
of theological, moral, or juridical norms, but rather on the 
institutional and structural quality of political forms. States pursued 
war against each other on one and the same level, and each side 
viewed the other not as traitors and criminals, but as justi hostes. In 
other words, the right of war was based exclusively on the quality of 
the belligerent agents of jus belli, and this quality was based on the 
fact that equal sovereigns pursued war against each other.7  
 
Secondly, both the political and legal relationships between states 
must governed by a strict reciprocity; now that the domain of international 
legal personality is exhausted by the secular state, the neutrality and the 
objectivity of the law of war can be secured through the exclusionary 
identification of the ‘violent’ party with the statist form. 
 
The sovereign territorial state initiated war ‘in form’ – not through 
norms, but through the fact that it bracketed war on the basis of 
mutual territoriality, and made war on European soil into a relation 
between specific, spatially concrete, and organized orders, i.e., into a 
military action of state-organized armies against similarly-organized 
armies on the opposing side.8  
 
This explains Schmitt’s obsession with the telluric: the reduction of 
the state to terrestrial ‘walls’ secures onto-political and judicial certainty by 
precluding the existence of both non-state political actors and legal 
personalities. 
                                                     
6 Schmitt, Nomos, 187.  
7 Ibidem, 143. 
8 Ibidem, 157-8. 
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The binding character of a comprehensive spatial order immediately 
is recognizable if the spatial order is conceived of as a balance9 […] 
Only armed struggle between state sovereigns was war in the sense 
of international law, and only this type of struggle fulfilled the 
requirements of the concept of justus hostis. Everything else was 
criminal prosecution and suppression of robbers, rebels, and pirates 
[...] To the essence of hostis belongs the aequalitas. Robbers, pirates, 
and rebels are not enemies, not justi hostes, but objects to be rendered 
harmless and prosecuted as criminals.10  
 
And this, in turn, explains the title of the text: nomos is the wall that 
signifies not only the establishment of borders (both material and 
epistemological) but the onto-political foundation of the polity itself.11 
 
Nomos is the measure by which the land in a particular order is divided 
and situated; it is also the form of the political, social, and religious 
order determined by this process. Here, measure, order, and form 
constitute a spatially concrete unity. The nomos by which a tribe, a 
retinue, or a people becomes settled, i.e., by which it becomes 
historically situated and turns part of the earth’s surface into a force-
field of a particular order, becomes visible in the appropriation of 
land and in the founding of a city or a colony.12 
 
According to Schmitt, ‘the term land-appropriation is better than 
land-division, because land-appropriation, both externally and internally, 
points clearly to the constitution of a radical title.’13 The originary act of the 
appropriation of radical title is foundational in two ways: it secures the 
homogeneity, both political and ontological, of the resulting polity and it 
guarantees the epistemic regime of the juridical order; every ‘state regime, in 
the specific and historical sense of the word “state”, is based on a separation 
                                                     
9 Schmitt, Nomos, 188. 
10 Ibidem, 153.  
11 ‘In particular, nomos can be described as a wall, because, like a wall, it, too, is 
based on sacred orientations. The nomos can grow and multiply like land and 
property: all human nomoi are “nourished” by a single divine nomos.’ Ibidem, 70-1. 
12 Ibidem, 70. 
13 Ibidem, 81. 
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of public centralization and private economy.’ 14  The importance of the 
telluric for the coherence of ius publicum Europaeum, therefore, cannot be 
over-estimated. It is the primary appropriation and secondary 
division/demarcation that infuses the nomos that validates both the objective 
legal identities of the actors within the order and the epistemic unity of the 
juridical system governing their actions – the ‘bracketing’ of war. 
 
This fundamental process of land-appropriation preceded the 
distinction between public and private law, public authority and 
private property, imperium and dominium. Land-appropriation thus is 
the archetype of a constitutive legal process externally (vis-à-vis other 
peoples) and internally (for the ordering of land and property within 
a country). It creates the most radical title, in the full and 
comprehensive sense of the term radical title.15 
 
Thus, Schmitt is able to conclude that land-appropriation ‘precedes 
the distinction between private and public law; in general, it creates the 
conditions for this distinction. To this extent, from a legal perspective, one 
might say that land-appropriation has a categorical character.’16 
As an historian of public international law, I find two items of 
outstanding interest in Schmitt’s text. The first is the radical 
incommensurability that he posits for land and sea, not only as juro-political 
space but as epistemic regime. The physical impossibility of the 
appropriation of the sea relegates oceanic space to legal indeterminacy.  
 
The sea knows no such apparent unity of space and law, of order and 
orientation. Certainly, the riches of the sea – fishes, pearls, and other 
things – likewise are won by the hard work of human labor, but not, 
like the fruits of the soil, according to an inner measure of sowing 
and reaping. On the sea, fields cannot be planted and firm lines 
cannot be engraved. Ships that sail across the sea leave no trace… 
The sea has no character, in the original sense of the word, which 
                                                     
14 Schmitt, Nomos, 210. For Schmitt’s insistence, both normative and descriptive, on 
the homogeneity of the properly constituted State, see C. Mouffe, ‘Carl Schmitt and 
the Paradox of Liberal Democracy’ in: C. Mouffe ed., The Challenge of Carl Schmitt 
(London 1999) 38-53. 
15 Schmitt, Nomos, 46-7. 
16 Ibidem, 46. 
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comes from the Greek charassein, meaning to engrave, to scratch, to 
imprint. The sea is free.17  
 
The second is that Schmitt identifies England, the hegemon of the 
modern world-system that evolved in the eighteenth century, as the true 
author of the internal public order because of its singular geo-spatial 
negotiation of land and sea; ‘what is to be kept in mind is the great balance 
of land and sea that the nomos of the Europe-dominated earth sustained.’18 
The balance of power that is grounded on the originary appropriation of 
land is effectively mediated through England’s world-historical role as 
maritime hegemon. 
 
The separation of firm land and free sea was the basic principle of 
the jus publicum Europaeum. This spatial order did not derive 
essentially from internal European land-appropriations and territorial 
changes, but rather from the European land-appropriation of a new 
non-European world in conjunction with England’s sea-
appropriation of the free sea. Vast, seemingly endless free space 
made possible and viable the internal law of an interstate European 
order.19  
 
The Anglo-centric nature of Schmitt’s work yields a misleading 
analysis of the hegemony of The United Provinces in the seventeenth 
century period of the world-system and a thorough under-theorization of 
the contribution of Dutch jurists – Hugo Grotius in particular – to the 
formation of the European nomos;20 Schmitt mentions Grotius’ seminal text 
De iure praedae (1604-1606) only once21 and openly identifies as the ‘true 
founders of European international law’ the civic humanists (‘primitive’ 
positivists) Alberico Gentile and Richard Zouche,22 marginalizing Grotius 
and the entire late scholastic tradition. 
 
 
 
                                                     
17 Schmitt, Nomos, 42-3.  
18 Ibidem, 173. 
19 Ibidem, 183. See also, idem, Part Three, Chapter Three, 172-84, passim. 
20 Ibidem, 179-80. 
21 Ibidem, 179. 
22 Ibidem, 309. 
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Grotius and natural law 
 
As I have sought to demonstrate in my own text on the Grotian juvenilia, 
The Savage Republic, the development of neo-naturalist ‘primitive legal 
scholarship’ in the pivotal sixteenth and seventeenth centuries can only be 
rendered fully intelligible when placed within the contours of Dutch, not 
English, hegemony.23 Although I did not use Schmitt in my own work, his 
views on the relationship between nomos and the jus publicum Europaeum are 
not unlike my own. Where we differ is in our approach to historical 
materialism (or, more accurately, ‘materialist historicism’); where Schmitt 
deploys the discourse of geo-politics, I undertake a ‘critical translation’ of 
geo-spatial concepts into the terms of world-systems analysis: regional and 
global world-systems for nomos.24 Like Schmitt, my central concern is with 
the ‘bracketing’ of war by jus publicum Europaeum; the primary task of De iure 
praedae is ‘to show that private trading companies were as entitled to make 
war as were the traditional sovereigns of Europe.’25 The doctrinal problem 
confronting Grotius at the time of authorship was the dramatic alteration of 
Dutch privateering policy, the seizure of the Portuguese carrack the Santa 
Catarina in 160326 marking an irrevocable shift away from orthodox – and 
legitimate – self-defence to more legally and morally ambivalent forms of 
armed aggression;27 invariably ‘privateering wars prolonged the functional 
                                                     
23 E. Wilson, The Savage Republic: De Indis of Hugo Grotius, Republicanism, and Dutch 
Hegemony in the Early Modern World-System (c.1600-1619) (Leiden 2008). 
24 Wilson, The Savage Republic, 57-135.  
25 R. Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace: Political Thought and International Order from 
Grotius to Kant (Oxford 1999) 85. 
26 P. Borschberg, ‘The Santa Catarina Incident of 1603; Dutch Freebooting, the 
Portuguese Estado da India and Inter-Asian Trade at the Dawn of the 17th Century’, 
Review of Cultures 11 (2004) 13-25. 
27 In economic terms, the policy shift towards aggressive maritime predation may 
have constituted an effort by the Dutch to secure a new source of ‘protection rent’ 
even if only negatively through the displacement of higher protection costs to the 
Portuguese. ‘There are some protection costs which are obviously defensive– such 
as the cost of convoys to ward off pirates; others – such as the cost of capturing 
ships of other nations engaged in competing enterprises – might be called offensive 
protection costs.’ F. C. Lane, Profits from Power: Readings in Protection Rent and Violence-
Controlling Enterprises (Albany, NY 1979) 27. 
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association between war and commerce.’ 28  De iure praedae is, therefore, 
governed by two signature rhetorical stratagems. The first is the attribution 
of an international normative/holistic order to international politics, derived 
from competing variants of natural law (ius naturale), 29 the only form of 
jurisprudence that could effectively bind actors operating across numerous 
‘walls’. The second is the replication of the radically heterogenous political 
logic of both the modern world-system and the capitalist world-economy –
the trans-border economic ‘composite of strikingly different trends of the 
component sectors’30 – as the juridical foundation of seventeenth century 
international public order, the nomos of European hegemony. Simply put, 
the text ‘translates’ the operational requirements of the world-economy into 
the terms of naturalist jurisprudence. 
By positing the United Provinces as the first ‘true’ hegemon31 and 
locating jus publicum Europaeum within both Dutch republicanism and 
jurisprudence,32 I am forced to come to very different conclusions from 
Schmitt as to the historical nature of the early modern nomos. Nowhere is 
this more apparent than in our respective attitudes towards both the sea and 
to piracy. Schmitt’s entire project is premised upon the homogeneity of a 
juridically indivisible sovereign. 33  By contrast, I hold that the European 
nomos is governed by an irreducible heterogeneity; the sea is not the signifier 
of the absence of a unifying presence (‘land-appropriation’), but rather the 
signifier of the presence of a radical reversibility, or iterability, of all fixed 
juro-political demarcations, or ‘walls’.34 The inversion of the state itself is 
the logical outcome: the iterability of the high seas creates a space for the 
absolute de-bracketing of war which enables the wholesale substitution of 
the lawful combatant for the unlawful. Maritime predation is not the 
‘enemy’ of the early modern state, it is its apotheosis. 
                                                     
28 A. Perotin-Dumon, ‘The Pirate and the Emperor: Power and the Law on the 
Seas, 1450-1850’ in: J. D. Tracy ed., The Political Economy of Merchant Empires 
(Cambridge 1991) 196-227: 221. 
29  Civic Humanism and Late Scholasticism, respectively; see Wilson, The Savage 
Republic. 
30 I. Wallerstein, ‘The Inter-State Structure of the Modern World-System’ in: S. 
Smith et al. ed., International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge 1996) 87-107: 
89. 
31 Wilson, The Savage Republic, 137-87. 
32 Ibidem, 189-260. 
33 C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political. G. Schwab trans. (Chicago 2007). 
34 Wilson, The Savage Republic, 235-47. 
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This brings us to piracy and Schmitt’s failure to come to terms with 
Grotius. 
 
 
Piracy as Liminality 
 
The pirate destroys all government and all order, by breaking all those ties and bonds that 
unite people in a civil society under any government. –Daniel Defoe 
 
For Schmitt the material impossibility of a foundational (primeval) and 
demarcating act of maritime-appropriation renders the juro-political identity 
of the marine actor radically in-determinate. 
 
Originally, before the birth of great sea powers, the axiom ‘freedom 
of the sea’ meant something very simple, that the sea was a free zone 
of booty. Here, the pirate could ply his wicked trade with a clear 
conscience… On the open sea, there were no limits, no boundaries, 
no consecrated sites, no sacred orientations, no law, and no 
property.35  
 
Historically, pirates, as with other ‘pariah entrepreneurs’,36 bear the 
sign of what anthropologists call ‘liminality’, the traversing of cultural 
frontiers.  
 
The attribute of liminality, or of liminal personae (threshold people) 
are necessarily ambiguous, since this condition and these persons 
elide or slip through the network of classifications that normally 
locate states and positions in cultural space. Liminal entities are 
neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions 
assigned and arranged by law, custom, convention and ceremonial.37  
                                                     
35 Schmitt, Nomos, 43. 
36 M. Castells, End of the Millenium. The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture. 
Volume Three (Oxford 1998) 166-205; ‘a private agent who manages to achieve 
monopoly over violence in a specific territory [who] eventually becomes a public 
actor.’ R. Catanzaro, ‘Violent Social Regulation: Organized Crime in the Italian 
South’, Social and Legal Studies 3 (1994) 267-79: 270. 
37  V. Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure (Ithaca NY, 1969) 95; 
idem, 94-130, 166-203; V. Turner, Drama, Fields and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in 
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The pirate’s archetypal ‘anti-social’ status as ‘enemy of all mankind’ –
the pirate as one who takes up arms against both his natural and political 
family (the state) – is a dominant motif within piratical literature and 
jurisprudence. The ‘first cousin’ to the pirate, the bandit/brigand, also 
exhibits similar liminal qualities.  
 
The crucial fact about the bandit’s social situation is its ambiguity. 
He is an outsider and rebel, a poor man who refuses to accept the 
normal rules of poverty… This draws him close to the poor; he is 
one of them. It sets him in opposition to the hierarchy of power, 
wealth and influence; he is not one of them… At the same time the 
bandit is, inevitably, drawn into the web of wealth and power, 
because, unlike other peasants, he acquires wealth and exerts power. 
He is ‘one of us’ who is constantly in the process of becoming 
associated with ‘them’.38  
 
The liminal pirate/brigand constitutes an exquisitely material 
embodiment of the principle of iterability, ‘rhetorical reversibility’. 39  In 
addition to blurring the orthodox demarcations between religious (i.e. the 
renagodoes of the Barbary Coast40), racial41 and gender42 (i.e. trans-sexuality43 
                                                                                                                       
Human Society (Ithaca, NY 1974) 231-70; A. Van Gennep, The Rites of Passage, M. B. 
Vizedom and G. L. Caffe trans. (London 1960) 1-8, 20-5, 144-5, 191-4. 
38 E. Hobsbawm, Bandits (London 1969) 87-8. 
39 R. Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror (Cambridge, MA 1986) 212-17. 
40 P. L. Wilson, Pirate Utopias: Moorish Corsairs, & European Renegadoes (Brooklyn, NY 
1995) 39-69. 
41 K. J. Kinkor, ‘Black Men Under the Black Flag’ in: C. R. Pennell ed., Bandits at 
Sea: A Pirate Reader (New York 2001) 195-210. 
42 ‘Attributes of sexlessness and anonymity are highly characteristic of liminality. In 
many kinds of initiation where the neophytes are both sexes, males and females are 
dressed alike and referred to by the same name.’ Turner, Ritual Process, 102-3. 
43 J. C. Appleby, ‘Women and Piracy in Ireland: from Graine O’Malley to Anne 
Bonny’ in: C. R. Pennell ed., Bandits at Sea: A Pirate Reader (New York 2001) 283-98; 
D. Murray, ‘Cheng I Sao in Fact and Fiction’ in: C. R. Pennell ed., Bandits at Sea: A 
Pirate Reader (New York 2001) 253-82; M. Rediker, ‘Liberty Beneath the Jolly Roger: 
the Lives of Anne Bonney and Mary Read, Pirates’ in: C. R. Pennell ed., Bandits at 
Sea: A Pirate Reader (New York 2001) 299-320. 
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and homosexuality44) identities, the pirate was the quintessential ‘juridical 
nomad’ who frequently traversed the porous juridical spaces separating the 
unlawful maritime ‘pariah entrepreneur’ and the ostensibly ‘lawful’ privateer. 
In parallel fashion, the high seas as juridically ‘empty’ space res nullius signify 
a liminal cultural zone, subverting all taxonomic classifications of 
established juridical hierarchies. In more prosaic terms, ‘if you stuck to the 
[Schmittean] territoriality principle, the high seas [were] nothing but a huge 
expanse of lawlessness.’45 
In narrower legal terms, the subversive liminality of piracy was 
virtually guaranteed through the inherently ambivalent juridical status of the 
practice: ‘a legalistic approach runs into the fact that there is not, and never 
has been an authoritative definition of piracy in international law.’ 46 
Privateers/pirates, operating as ‘juridical nomads’, constituted an irreducibly 
chaotic element within the primitive world-system of the seventeenth 
century; any strategy of maritime predation, ‘however and whenever it was 
performed, was valid, provided it worked and was profitable. What we are 
talking about is not a choice between merchant and corsairs, but men [and 
women] who were sometimes one, sometimes the other, sometimes both 
simultaneously.’47 Ironically, the attempt to clearly demarcate between piracy 
and privateering was historically governed by extra-judicial forces: the 
abolition of privateering and the subsequent universal criminalisation of 
piracy were both ultimately dependent upon states de-legitimating privatised 
armed forces.  
 
‘Privateering generated organized Piracy. Mercenaries threatened to 
drag their home states into other state’s wars. Mercantile companies 
turned their guns on each other and even on their home states. The 
                                                     
44 B. R. Burg, Sodomy and the Pirate Tradition: English Sea Rovers in the Seventeenth Century 
Caribbean (New York 1983); D. Murray, ‘The Practice of Homosexuality among the 
Pirates of Late-Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth-Century China’ in: C. R. Pennell 
ed., Bandits at Sea: A Pirate Reader (New York 2001) 244-52. 
45 J. W. F. Sundberg, ‘Piracy: Air and Sea’, De Paul Law Review 20 (1993) 337-435: 
393. 
46 B. H. Dubner, The Law of International Sea-Piracy (The Hague 1980) 39. 
47 G. L. Nadal, ‘Corsairing as a Commercial System: the Edges of Legitimate Trade’ 
in: C. R. Pennell ed., Bandits at Sea: A Pirate Reader (New York 2001) 125-36: 132. 
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result was probably the closest the modern system has ever come to 
experiencing real anarchy.48 
 
 At the same time, the universal de-legitimation of privatised armies as 
illuminated at great length by Schmitt49 was economically viable only after 
the states had found alternative ways of generating for themselves an 
adequately profitable rate of ‘protection rent’.  
 
Tribute-paying empires yielded diminishing returns as they drew 
more manpower into the maintenance and extension of such 
conquests. The protection rents stimulated oceanic commerce and 
industries which found new markets from wider trade. In… the 
period of the expansion of Europe, those fields of enterprise yielded 
increasing return.50 
 
As we should expect, irregularities of legal taxonomy parallel 
vicissitudes of state praxis.  
 
Technically, pirates were clearly distinguishable from privateers. 
Privateers possessed a state’s authority to commit violence. They 
targeted only the enemies of the authorizing state… [Yet] at the end 
of every war, large numbers of privateers turned pirates only to be 
granted new privateering commissions on the outbreak of the next 
war. So long as states insisted to exploit individual violence, piracy 
could not even be defined, much less suppressed.51  
 
Piracy had to be proscribed so as to maintain the ‘correct’ 
hierarchical relationship between lawful and unlawful forms of maritime 
violence, such as privateering, juridically signified by the letter of marque. 
However, the absence of any self-regulating form of juridical classification, 
coupled with the inherent parallels between the twin forms of predation, 
rendered a self-grounding taxonomy impossible; the  
 
                                                     
48 J. E. Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial 
Violence in Early Modern Europe (Princeton 1994) 43. 
49 Schmitt, Nomos, 152-4, 157-8. 
50 Lane, Profits from Power, 36. 
51 Thomson, Mercenaries, 140. 
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‘lack of a legal definition of international piracy shows the relativity 
that has always characterised the identity of the pirate [in] the terms 
employed… pirate, privateer, corsair, freebooter… When all was said 
and done, the pirate was the “other”; he was a problem because he 
was culturally different’.52  
 
On closer examination, piracy appears to be an inherently composite 
or ‘fragmentary’ concept.  
 
The word ‘piracy’ is being used in certain treaties only because of its 
historical connotations, even though the context of the treaties 
demonstrates that the types of ‘piracy’ included therein are usually 
nothing more than separate domestic crimes of terrorism (which 
knows no boundary demarcation) joined together under the word 
piracy… If this is so, then there really is no uniform offence or crime 
of piracy. Rather, the word piracy could constitute one or many 
different crimes and acts of terrorism according to the dictates of the 
State which is affected by the incident(s).53  
 
According to Alfred P. Rubin, the  
 
word “piracy” entered modern English usage in a vernacular sense to 
cover almost any interference with property rights, whether licensed 
or not, and was applied as a pejorative with political implications, but 
no clear legal meaning.54  
 
The minimally adequate ‘classical’ definition of piracy appears to be 
‘acts of depredation committed by a private ship against another ship on the 
high seas for private, commercial gain’;55 the only comprehensive definition 
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of piracy are provided by municipal authorities exercising territorial 
jurisdiction.56  
Schmitt, therefore, creates a grievous error when he writes that 
Grotius distinguishes ‘between jus gentium and jus civile [civil law]; 
[emphasizing] the difference between public authority (imperium or jurisdictio) 
and private or civil ownership (dominium).’57 From Grotius’ perspective, the 
problem was that the Portuguese regarded the Dutch privateers as pirates; 
juridically, they were both brigands in unlawful rebellion against Spain and 
‘outlaws’ within the exclusionary terms of the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494).58 
Similarly, the Spanish regarded all foreign vessels entering the West Indies 
as ‘piratical’, in terms of mare clausum.59 Natives of Malabar who attempted to 
trade outside the Portuguese control system, and anyone else in the area 
who opposed them, were described by the Portuguese as cossarios or 
Malavares; the terms were usually interchangeable. A cossario (in modern 
Portuguese corsario) is, strictly, a corsair.60 ‘Corsair’, in turn, was a generic 
term for maritime predator that frequently proved inseparable from 
‘privateer’ and ‘pirate’.61 The textual stratagem of Grotius therefore turned 
on the discursive invalidation of Portuguese imperialism while 
simultaneously symbolically validating Dutch maritime predation as a lawful 
activity cognisable within oceanic spaces that supersede national jurisdiction: 
res extra commercium.     
A signature, and supremely ‘anti-Schmittean’, characteristic of De iure 
praedae is the recurrence of competing notions of sovereignty, both divisible 
and indivisible; the binary opposition between the homogenous (Schmittean) 
and heterogeneous (anti-Schmittean) state is a defining characteristic of 
both De iure praedae in particular and of the Grotian corpus as a whole. This 
is self-evident in even such an early, or ‘juvenile’, text as the Commentarius in 
                                                                                                                       
understanding of a legal term means only that one realizes how to use it in 
communication with others.’ Sundberg, ‘Piracy’, 337.  
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Theses XI (c.1600) a wide-ranging defence of the ‘Dutch Revolt’ as a just war 
(ius belli). 62  Orthodox sixteenth century theories of resistance, or lawful 
rebellion, were founded on two cardinal premises, ‘natural liberty’ and the 
notion of the ‘inferior magistrate’. Under the first, ‘the People’ (publicae) are 
the true bearers of that legal identity and personality which historically pre-
dates any particular social formation; consequently, any subsequent act of 
lawful political incorporation rests upon the voluntary transfer of inalienable 
rights from the People to the polity. Under the second, the People possess 
an inalienable right to exercise lawful armed force against an otherwise 
legitimate public authority that has violated the conditions of the 
foundational act of conveyance through acts of tyranny. Broadly associated 
with the politically more moderate Protestant sect the Huguenots, 63  the 
concept of the ‘inferior magistrate’ was subjected to a more subversive 
doctrinal alteration by the more radically egalitarian Calvinists, 64  who 
expressly inferred an inalienable right to take up arms on the basis of 
‘natural liberty’ alone.  
Committed to a Venetian-style oligarchy,65 the Commentarius66 rejects 
radical resistance theory,67 postulating instead a via media derived from that 
multi-purpose free-floating Grotian signifier, divisible sovereignty, here re-
formulated as ‘residual sovereignty’, one that is inherent within the secular 
political order, but capable of indefinite sub-division. Article 16 provides a 
generic definition of sovereignty: 
                                                     
62 Wilson, The Savage Republic, 318-334. 
63 Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought. Volume II (Cambridge 1978) 
335; M. Van Gelderen, The Political Thought of the Dutch Revolt 1555-1590 (Cambridge 
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193-218. 
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That supreme right to govern the state which recognizes no supreme 
authority among humans, such that no person(s) may, through any 
right [ius] of his own, rescind what has been enacted thereby.68  
 
The text then moves to a more detailed empirical consideration of 
actus summae potestatis, those necessary ‘marks’ or signs of sovereignty; 
intriguingly, ‘right’ is clearly associated with ‘power’. 
Those that no one may rescind by virtue of any higher right, for 
example, the supreme right to introduce legislation and to withdraw it, the 
right to pass judgement and to grant pardon, the right to appoint 
magistrates and to relieve them of their office, the right to impose taxes on 
the people, etc.69 
Accordingly, 
 
If some marks [acti] rest with the prince, and others with the senate, 
or rather with the prince and the senate, one cannot claim that full 
sovereignty is either with the prince or with the senate, but [only] 
with the prince and the senate [together]. The prince and the senate, 
however, are not one but several.70 
 
The Commentarius then provides a ‘primitive’ theory of constitutional 
checks and balances, which is inseparable from a residual sovereignty that is 
identified with libertas;  
 
There are many benefits arising from dividing the marks of 
sovereignty and for this reason it is held to be prudent to keep some 
separate. Not least of these is that it seems to be the most 
convenient way of preventing tyranny.71  
 
In other words, there is a conditional right of resistance, dependent 
in turn upon issues of historical evidence and political identity. The 
Commentarius asserts 72  that there is persuasive historical evidence of a 
continuing presence of residual sovereignty within the Dutch ‘People’ (i.e. 
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the Batavians), institutionally expressed through the Ordines.73 As the Dutch 
Esates never expressly conveyed to ‘the Prince’ (i.e. Spain) the power to tax, 
libertas can be legally classified as a ‘legitimate spoil’ of bellum iustum, a lawful 
armed struggle between rival public authorities waged in pursuit of the 
enforcement of ius. ‘Batavian private persons’ (i.e. the Dutch), in both their 
particular and universal aspects, are co-sovereigns with the Spanish Crown, 
and constitute their own form of legitimate –and self-legitimising– public 
authority, that greatest of all republican conceits. 
 
The war against Philip was at its inception a just war both in respect 
of its cause and with regard to [the Batavian’s] defence of their marks 
of sovereignty… We have demonstrated briefly that it was legitimate 
for the States of Holland to convene against Philip; that the war was 
both just and public that was undertaken by them either unanimously 
or on the basis of majority decision; and that all the marks of 
sovereignty that once rested with Philip were [subsequently] acquired 
by the States [of Holland].74 
 
Divisible Sovereignty and bellum iustum receive even more radically 
republican expression in De iure praedae which provides a crucial 
textual/discursive linkage between the just war waged by the Dutch East 
India Company (the VOC) and the republican precepts of the lawful war of 
national liberation: ‘The power that has been bestowed upon a prince can 
be revoked, particularly when the prince exceeds the bounds defining his 
office, since in such circumstances he ceases ipso facto to be regarded as a 
prince.’75 Herein, residual sovereignty and republicanism are neatly fused 
with the self-grounding legitimation of Dutch national independence;  
 
Since the State has no superior, it is necessarily the judge even of its 
own cause. Thus the assertion made by Tacitus… was true, namely 
                                                     
73 For Grotius, every society, ‘including States, is regarded as deriving its existence, 
in the last resort, from the Individual; and [no society] rises above the level of a 
system of relations established by agreement between the owners of individual 
rights’. O. Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society 1500 to 1800, With a Lecture on 
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74 Grotius, Commentarius, 283. 
75 H. Grotius, De Iure Praedae Commentarius. Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty, 
G. L. Williams and W. H. Zeydel trans. (London 1964) 289. 
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that by a provision emanating from the Divine Will, the people were 
to brook no other judge than themselves.76 
 
A more ‘anti-Schmittean’ constitutional theory is difficult to imagine. 
The iterability, or radical reversibility, of the ‘mark’ of sovereignty as itself 
constitutive of sovereignty, unintentionally belies the wholly constructivist –
and, therefore, contingent – nature of the alleged ‘sovereign’. The actus is 
radically ambiguous, not identical with either potestatis or ius, but a signifier 
of the highly liminal nature of sovereignty itself;77  
 
the term actus suggests not a diagnostic criterion which serves to 
indicate who possesses sovereign power, but the active exercise of 
some part of that power; the rendering function might be equally 
important.78  
 
The radically contextualist nature of the acti highlights the extreme 
iterability that governs the Grotian negotiation of the relationships between 
‘public’ and ‘private’ actors. Within this discursive frame, both states and 
persons, including corporations,79 are fully able to exercise the ‘sovereignty 
function’ and, thereby, acquire the signature ‘mark’. In other words, 
sovereignty (libertas) – through its radical divisibility – can become the 
‘property’ of anyone. 
 
 
The Sovereignty of the Private Avenger 
 
[A] transformation may take place, not merely in the case of individuals, as when Jephtes, 
Arsaces, and Viriathus instead of being leaders of brigands, became lawful chiefs, but 
also in the case of groups, so that those who have been robbers embracing another mode of 
life became a state. –Hugo Grotius 
 
The Grotian privatisation of sovereignty and the resultant juridical blurring 
of ‘public’ and ‘private’ identity create an element of cognitive dissonance in 
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the modern reader. The late scholastic doctrine of bellum iustum is a juro-
theological expression of feudal dispute resolution,80 predicated upon public 
warfare and lawful retaliation;81 ‘the legality of reprisals is conditioned upon 
two requirements: the authority of a superior and a just cause.’82 A crucial 
consideration introduced by Grotius is that the authorizing entity merely 
possesses the minimally requisite mark of sovereignty. ‘It was not necessary 
that the war be conducted by this highest authority itself; subordinate 
princes and authorities could be delegated to conduct a bellum iusticale.’83 In 
other words, it is the legal identity of the actor that determines the justness 
of the conflict.  
 
It is not the power to punish essentially a power that pertains to the 
state [res publica]? Not at all! On the contrary, just as every right of the 
magistrate comes to him from the state, so has the same right come 
to the state from private individuals, and similarly, the power of the 
state is the result of collective agreement… Therefore, since no one is able 
to transfer a thing that he never possessed, it is evident that the right of 
chastisement was held by private persons before it was held by the state. The 
following argument, to, has great force in this connection; the state 
inflicts punishment for wrongs against itself, not only upon its own 
subjects, but also upon foreigners; yet it denies no power over the 
latter from civil law, which is binding upon citizens only because 
they have given their consent; and therefore, the law of nature, or 
law of the nation, is the source from which the state receives the 
power in question.84  
 
Notice how Grotius subtly conflates positive state law with natural 
law; the ‘loose’ association among rights-holders, which is civil society, is 
then re-configured as a ‘society of vigilantes’, subject to the transferential 
legitimacy of public authority. The net result is a remarkable display of 
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iterability between contending notions of collective/public and 
individual/private sovereignties. 
 
The power of execution [is] conferred upon private individuals by a 
special law… For the wars that result when arms are taken up in 
such circumstances should perhaps be called public rather than 
private, since the state undertakes these wars, in a sense, and gives the 
command for them to be waged by said individuals. Yet it is true that, 
in the majority of cases, the national origins of such conflicts is the same as 
that of private wars. To take one example, certain laws grant the power 
of direct self-defence and vengeance 85  to private individuals, 
precisely on the ground that it is not easy to resist soldiers and 
collectors of public revenue through the medium of the courts; and 
these particular precepts accordingly represent what we retain of 
natural law – the vestiges of that law, so to speak – in regard to 
punishment. If the state is involved, what just end can be sought by 
the private avenger? The answer to this question is readily found in 
the teachings of Seneca, the philosopher who maintains that there are two 
kinds of commonwealth, the world state and the municipal state. In other 
words, the private avenger has in mind the good of the whole human race, 
just as when he slays a serpent; and this goal corresponds exactly to 
that common good towards which, as we have said, all punishment’s 
are directed in nature’s plan.86 
 
The enigmatic figure of ‘the private avenger’ is arguably the most 
alien, and the most ‘un-Schmittean’, juridical construct within the Grotian 
Heritage.87 Martine van Ittersum has persuasively shown that the rhetorical 
figure was modelled on no other than Admiral Van Heemskerck, the prize-
taker of the Santa Catarina and first cousin to Hugo Grotius.88 She situates 
the historical genesis of De iure praedae in Grotius’ efforts to ‘disentangle’ the 
conflicting rhetoric employed by the Dutch admiralty board in adjudicating 
the prize. Whereas Van Heemskerck justified his actions through private 
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reliance upon ius naturale, the admiralty legitimised the seizure in terms of 
lawful revenge, or reprisal; 
 
what had been revenge pure and simple in the resolution of [the 
privateers] became punishment for transgression of the natural law 
in De Jure Praedae [sic], meted out by private individuals exercising 
their natural rights.89  
 
For the world-system, lawful maritime predation constituted a 
legitimate enforcement of a naturalist form of private authority.  
In terms of international legal discourse, however, lawful privateering 
at once signified the inversion of the hierarchy between private and public 
authority marking a sub-textual conflation of privateering with piracy. 
Privateering renders iterable public/private dichotomies through the state’s 
adoption of private agency, the legitimacy of which may be effectively 
invalidated through non-recognition by a rival state. The privateer is 
inherently ‘dangerous’ precisely because of the self-same iterability; the 
radical contingency of the legal identity of the privateer constantly invokes 
the ‘lurking presence’ of the unlawful maritime predator, the pirate. 
Whatever Grotius’ authorial intent, whether to doctrinally clarify the verdict 
of the admiralty or to legitimise the privateering actions of the VOC, his 
seminal creation of the private avenger unquestionably violates that most 
foundational of modern constitutional precepts – the homogenous state as 
monopoliser of organised violence. Grotian iterability and juridical 
inversion reach their zenith at precisely this juncture, reducing interstate 
relations to a collective aggregate of ‘private’ transactions through the 
assignment of international legitimacy to any entity that is capable of 
exercising lawful violence as a ‘strong’ right, or ius. 
All of which is anathema to Schmitt as he freely admits: ‘The 
irregularity of the pirate lacks any relation to regularity.’90 The historical role 
played by piracy in the formation of the early modern state and world-
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system and the naturalist judicial account of it offered by Grotius is the 
antithesis of Schmitt’s views on both the historical development of the 
European nomos and the political foundation of the homogenous and 
indivisible state. ‘The exception confounds the unity and order of the 
rationalist scheme’91 and the unlawful combatant – or ‘partisan’ in Schmitt’s 
terminology – threatens the unity of legal discourse; ‘Law is the unity of 
order and orientation, and the problem of the partisan is the problem of 
relations between regular and irregular struggle.’92 Even in his comparatively 
late work Theory of the Partisan (1963), Schmitt refuses to relinquish the 
land/sea dichotomy as the geo-spatial basis for the demarcation between 
unlawful and unlawful combatants within the neo-colonial era of the world 
nomos; it is ‘political recognition that the irregular fighter needs in order not 
to be considered in the un-political sense of a thief or a pirate, which here 
means: not to sink into the criminal realm.’93 As we should expect, Schmitt 
is able to conclude that the irregular forces of the Developing World are 
‘lawful’ in some primal way because they signify telluric forces – which is 
precisely what ‘separates’ them from the ocean-bound pariah entrepreneur. 
 
The partisan is and remains distinct, not only from the pirate, but 
likewise the corsair, even as land and sea, as different elemental 
spaces of human labor and military struggle between nations, remain 
distinct. Land and sea have developed not only different means of 
pursuing war, and different theaters of war, but also different 
concepts of war, enemy, and booty. For at least as long as anti-
colonial wars are possible on our planet, the partisan will represent a 
specifically terrestrial type of active fighter.94 
 
The one thing that must never be conceded is the iterability between 
the partisan and the pirate, for to do so would imperil the entirety of 
Schmitt’s political ontology. 
 
The intense political [public] character of the partisan must be kept 
in mind, because he must be distinguished from the ordinary thief 
and violent criminal, whose motives are directed towards private 
enrichment. This conceptual criterion of the political character [of the 
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partisan] has the un-political character of his evil deeds, which are 
focused on private robbery and theft. The pirate has, as the jurists 
say, animus furandi [evil intent]. The partisan fights at front, and 
precisely the political character of his acts restores the original 
meaning of the word partisan. The word derives from party, and refers 
to the tie to a fighting, belligerent, or politically active party or group. 
These ties to a party become especially strong in revolutionary 
times.95 
 
If the boundaries between public and private, polity and property, 
imperium and dominium are shown to be liminal then both the intelligibility 
(epistemic) and the legitimacy (normative) of the state dissolve: the true 
source of sovereignty can be crime. And it is Schmitt himself who sows the 
seeds for his own ‘deconstruction’. 
 
Thus, in some form, the constitutive process of a land-appropriation 
is found at the beginning of the history of every settled people, every 
commonwealth, every empire. This is true as well for the beginning 
of every historical epoch. Not only logically, but also historically, 
land-appropriation precedes the order that follows from it. It 
constitutes the original spatial order, the source of all further 
concrete order and all further law. It is the reproductive root in the 
normative order of history. All further property relations – 
communal or individual, public or private property, and all forms of 
possession and use in society and in international law – are derived 
from this radical title. All subsequent law and everything 
promulgated and enacted thereafter as decrees and commands are 
nourished, to use Heraclitus’ word, by this source.96 
 
Heraclitus said that ‘War is the Father of all things’; so too, in their 
own ways, did both Schmitt and Grotius. And it is the utter impossibility of 
achieving the self-grounding validation of the bracketing of war and 
violence that is the source of so much legal peril. Schmitt seeks certainty by 
restricting the state to space; yet, the actual history of the jus publicum 
Europaeum as revealed by Grotius is that the early state was a being of ‘right’ 
governed by the naturalist political ontology that made possible the lawful 
authority of the private avenger. We are left, then with the disturbing 
possibility that the king is a pirate. 
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